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In response to the Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak 
in West Africa, the World Health Organization has 
advised all nations to prepare for the detection, inves-
tigation and management of confirmed and suspected 
EVD cases in order to prevent further spread through 
international travel. To gain insights into the state of 
preparedness of European hospitals, an electronic 
survey was circulated in August–September 2014 to 
984 medical professionals representing 736 hospitals 
in 40 countries. The survey addressed the willingness 
and capacity to admit patients with suspected EVD as 
well as specific preparedness activities in response 
to the current Ebola crisis. Evaluable responses were 
received from representatives of 254 (32%) hospitals 
in 38 countries, mostly tertiary care centres, of which 
46% indicated that they would admit patients with 
suspected EVD. Patient transfer agreements were in 
place for the majority of hospitals that would not admit 
patients. Compared with non-admitting hospitals, 
admitting hospitals were more frequently engaged in 
various preparedness activities and more often con-
tained basic infrastructural characteristics such as 
admission rooms and laboratories considered impor-
tant for infection control, but some gaps and concerns 
were also identified. The results of this survey help to 
provide direction towards further preparedness activi-
ties and prioritisation thereof.  
Introduction
The unprecedented and devastating epidemic of 
Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa, with over 
15,000 reported cases and nearly 5,500 deaths as 
of 21 November 2014 [1], has ignited increasing 
global concerns about the potential introduction and 
further spread of the disease by international travel 
and repatriation [2–4]. For this reason, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) has advised all nations, 
including those not directly neighbouring currently-
affected countries, to prepare for the detection, inves-
tigation and management of confirmed and suspected 
EVD cases [4]. In view of the non-specific nature of ini-
tial symptoms, suspected patients essentially include 
all travellers with unexplained febrile illness recently 
arrived from areas with ongoing EVD transmission, 
particularly when accompanied by gastrointestinal 
symptoms. The current assessment is that travel-asso-
ciated cases will remain rare across Europe, but that 
the occurrence of EVD in returning healthcare work-
ers is a realistic scenario [5,6]. The recent experiences 
with both types of EVD cases in the United States and 
Europe, with local transmission to healthcare workers, 
illustrate the importance of being prepared [7,8].
To gain insights into the preparedness of European 
hospitals and identify potential gaps in preparedness 
at hospital level, we conducted a survey of hospitals 
in 40 European and western Asian countries, focusing 
on the willingness and capacity to admit patients with 
suspected EVD and on specific preparedness activities 
of hospitals in response to the current Ebola crisis. It 
should be emphasised that the survey did not address 
preparedness for EVD at national levels but was solely 
intended to explore the preparedness at the hospital 
level.
This survey is an initiative of the PREPARE project. 
PREPARE (Platform for European Preparedness Against 
(Re-)emerging Epidemics) is an European Union 
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(EU)-funded project that aims to establish prepared-
ness for harmonised clinical research studies on epi-
demic infectious diseases, hence providing real-time 
evidence for clinical management of patients and to 
inform public health responses (www.prepare-europe.
eu). PREPARE is a partnership of established and 
developing European clinical research networks, cov-
ering primary care (GRACE and TRACE) and hospital 
care (CAPNETZ, COMBACTE, ESICM and PENTA) in more 
than 40 European countries, including all EU Member 
States. The survey was performed in above-mentioned 
hospital care networks.
Methods
Survey
A questionnaire was developed in English, addressing: 
characteristics of the hospital such as the geographic 
location, type (primary, secondary or tertiary care) 
and size of the hospital; the availability and content 
of national and hospital guidelines or protocols for the 
management of patients with suspected or confirmed 
haemorrhagic fever; the performance of preparedness 
activities in response to the Ebola crisis (e.g. revision 
of protocols, exercises to test the protocols, formation 
of a hospital outbreak management team, training of 
healthcare workers, or immediate plans to do so); and 
arrangements for Ebola virus (EBOV) diagnostics.
Table 1
Admission, guidelines and preparedness for patients with suspected Ebola virus disease in European hospitals, results from 
survey of representatives from 236 hospitals in 38 European and western Asian countries, August–September 2014
Total (%)
Would admit patient 
with suspected EVD 
(%)
Would not admit 
patient with 
suspected EVD (%)
Do not know (%) p-value
Hospital type 236 111 (47.0) 99 (42.0) 26 (11.0) -
Primary 5 (2.1) 2 (1.8) 2 (2.0) 1 (3.8) -
Secondary 46 (19.5) 13 (11.7) 23 (23.2) 10 (38.5) -
Tertiary 185 (78.4) 96 (86.5) 74 (74.7) 15 (57.7) -
National guidelines
Yes 181 (76.7) 90 (81.1) 75 (75.8) 16 (61.5) 0.047
No 30 (12.7) 14 (12.6) 13 (13.1) 3 (11.5) -
Do not know 25 (10.6) 7 (6.3) 11 (11.1) 7 (26.9) -
Topics covered
Triage criteria 165 (91.2) 83 (92.2) 70 (93.3) 12 (75.0) 0.78
EBOV diagnostics 160 (88.4) 84 (93.3) 64 (85.3) 12 (75.0) 0.09
Other diagnostics 143 (79.0) 79 (87.7) 54 (72.0) 10 (62.5) 0.01
Infection control 174 (96.1) 89 (98.9) 72 (96.0) 13 (81.2) 0.23
Clinical management 137 (75.7) 76 (84.4) 52 (69.3) 9 (56.2) 0.02
Hospital guidelines
Yes 153 (64.8) 93 (83.8) 52 (52.5) 8 (30.8) < 0.01
No 60 (25.4) 13 (11.7) 36 (36.4) 11 (42.3) -
Do not know 23 (9.7) 5 (4.5) 11 (11.1) 7 (26.9) -
Topics covered
Triage criteria 146 (95.4) 90 (96.8) 49 (94.2) 7 (87.5) 0.46
EBOV diagnostics 123 (80.4) 82 (88.2) 38 (73.1) 3 (37.5) 0.02
Other diagnostics 133 (86.9) 90 (96.8) 38 (73.1) 5 (62.5) < 0.01
Infection control 151 (98.7) 93 (100) 51 (98.1) 7 (87.5) 0.18
Clinical management 118 (77.1) 79 (84.9) 34 (65.4) 5 (62.5) < 0.01
Preparedness efforts
Revision protocols 168 (71.2) 95 (85.6) 64 (64.6) 9 (34.6) < 0.01
Training HCW 131 (55.5) 81 (73.0) 46 (46.5) 4 (15.4) < 0.01
Hospital OMT 121 (51.3) 79 (71.2) 41 (41.4) 1 (3.8) < 0.01
National OMT 89 (37.7) 57 (51.4) 31 (31.3) 1 (3.8) < 0.01
Exercise 67 (28.4) 51 (45.9) 16 (16.2) 0 (0) < 0.01
EVD: Ebola virus disease; EBOV: Ebola virus; HCW: healthcare worker; OMT: outbreak management team. 
Primary care: general practice and basic district hospital services; secondary care: district hospitals with basic specialty functions; tertiary 
care: specialised care, usually on referral from primary or secondary care, with facilities for special investigations and treatment.
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In addition, the questionnaire asked whether hospi-
tals would, in principle, admit patients with suspected 
EVD, and if not, whether local or national agreements 
were in place for transfer to another hospital. For hos-
pitals that would admit patients with suspected EVD, 
additional questions were asked about the character-
istics of admission rooms (e.g. presence of an ante-
room, negative pressure, high-efficiency particulate air 
(HEPA) filtration). An open question was added to cap-
ture specific suggestions or needs in relation to EVD 
preparedness that could be addressed by the PREPARE 
project. Respondents could indicate whether or not 
permission was granted to use the anonymised results 
in reports or publications. The complete questionnaire 
is available upon request from the authors.
After pilot testing in three hospitals, an online link to 
the electronic questionnaire was circulated by email to 
984 medical professionals representing 736 hospitals 
in 38 European and 2 western Asian countries (Turkey 
and Israel). All hospitals were affiliated with the 
PREPARE project through membership of one or more 
of the following clinical research networks: CAPNETZ 
(www.capnetz.de), COMBACTE (www.combacte.com), 
ESICM (www.esicm.org), and PENTA (www.penta-id.
org).
The survey was started on 27 August 2014 and closed 
on 19 September 2014. Reminders to complete the sur-
vey were sent weekly during this three-week survey 
period.
Analysis
Descriptive statistics were used to analyse the sur-
vey data at the hospital level. In case of discrepant 
responses from multiple representatives of the same 
hospital, affirmative or negative answers took prec-
edence over ‘do not know’ replies. Comparisons were 
made between hospitals that would admit patients 
with suspected EVD and those that would not or 
did not know. In addition, comparisons were made 
between hospitals in the four regions of Europe 
Figure 1
Geographic distribution and numbers of responding hospitals, survey on willingness and capacity to admit patients with 
suspected Ebola virus disease, August–September 2014 (n=236)
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(eastern, northern, southern, western) and west-
ern Asia, as defined by the United Nations Statistics 
Division’s Geoscheme [9]. Differences between groups 
were analysed using chi-squared statistics. A p-value 
of less than 0.05 was considered significant. Analyses 
were performed using Microsoft Excel version 14.4.3 
(Microsoft Corporation).
Results
Survey characteristics
Responses were received from 266 out of 984 (27%) 
medical professionals of whom 12 did not provide per-
mission to use the data for reporting. The remaining 254 
respondents represented 236 of 736 hospitals (32%) in 
38 European and western Asian countries. The major-
ity of respondents were intensivists (122, 48%), fol-
lowed by internists/infectious disease specialists (49, 
19%) and clinical microbiologists (42, 17%). Among the 
remaining respondents were infection control special-
ist (19, 8%) and paediatricians (9, 4%). Hospitals repre-
sented in the survey were mostly tertiary care centres 
(78%) and were widely distributed across Europe and 
western Asia (Table 1, Figure 1).
Admission of patients with suspected EVD and 
characteristics of admission rooms
Of 236 hospitals, 111 (47%) stated that they would 
admit suspected EVD patients, 99 (42%) indicated 
that they would not admit such patients, and 26 (11%) 
did not know whether such patients would be admit-
ted (Table 1). In the 99 hospitals indicating they would 
not admit patients, local or national agreements 
for transfer of patients were in place in the majority 
(local 25 (25%), national 67 (68%)). Admission rooms 
of most of the 111 admitting hospitals, the majority of 
which were tertiary care centres (87%), had an ante-
room (87%), availability of negative pressure (69%), 
and/or the presence of dedicated ventilation systems 
(59%) (Figure 2A). Less than half used HEPA filtration 
of exhausted air (42%). In five hospitals (5%), none of 
these assets were available.
National and hospital guidelines for 
management of EVD patients
Respondents from 181 hospitals (77%) were aware of 
the existence of national guidelines for management of 
patients with haemorrhagic fever (including EVD) while 
30 hospitals (13%) indicated these were not available. 
The remaining respondents did not know (Table 1). 
Available guidelines were based on those from WHO 
(63%), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) (43%) and/or the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) (34%), and covered triage 
criteria and infection control practices in more than 
90% of guidelines, while diagnostics and clinical man-
agement were covered less frequently (Table 1).
Local hospital guidelines were available in 153 of 236 
hospitals (65%), not available in 60 hospitals (25%) 
and the remaining respondents did not know (Table 1). 
Guidelines were based on national guidelines in 81% 
and on international guidelines in the remaining cases 
(19%). Similar to national guidelines, triage criteria and 
infection control practices were covered in more than 
95% of local guidelines with less frequent coverage of 
other topics.
The availability of national, and even more so of hos-
pital guidelines was highest in hospitals that would 
Figure 2
Characteristics of admission facilities in hospitals 
admitting Ebola virus disease-suspected patients, survey 
on willingness and capacity to admit patients with 
suspected Ebola virus disease, August–September 2014 
(n=111) 
HEPA: high-efficiency particulate air. 
Percentages are represented overall (A) and per region (B).
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admit patients with suspected EVD compared with 
those that would not admit patients or did not know 
(Table 1).
Laboratory infrastructure and Ebola virus diagnostics
Microbiology laboratories were present in nearly 
all hospitals (98%) (Table 2). In these laboratories, 
biosafety level (BSL) 2 and 3 facilities were available 
in 57% and 24%, respectively and not available in 11% 
and 40%, respectively. In the remaining cases respond-
ents were not aware of the biosafety levels of the labo-
ratory (32% and 36%, respectively). Availability of BSL 
2 and 3 facilities was higher in hospitals that would 
admit patients (70% and 36%, respectively) compared 
with those that did not (51% and 14%, respectively).
EBOV diagnostics were performed on site in 17 hos-
pitals, which included 14 hospitals that would admit 
patients, 1 that would not admit patients and 2 that 
did not know. For the majority of remaining hospitals, 
agreements and procedures were in place for perfor-
mance of Ebola diagnostics in national (59%) or inter-
national (13%) reference laboratories.
Preparedness activities
Preparedness activities in response to the EVD out-
break included revision of hospital protocols or guide-
lines in 168 hospitals (71%), education and training 
of healthcare workers (HCWs) in 131 (56%), formation 
of an outbreak management team (OMT) in 121 (51%) 
and participation in regional or national prepared-
ness committees in 89 (38%) (Table 1). In 67 hospitals 
(28%), exercises to test procedures and protocols were 
completed or planned in the immediate future. All pre-
paredness activities were performed more frequently 
in hospitals that would admit patients (Table 1, Figure 
3).
Regional differences in Europe
Northern and western Europe had the highest pro-
portions of hospitals that would admit patients with 
suspected EVD (57% and 56% respectively) and this 
proportion was lowest in eastern European states (12%) 
(Table 3). Differences were noted between regions with 
respect to availability of national and local guidelines, 
laboratory infrastructure and preparedness activities, 
with highest frequencies mostly observed in western 
European countries, followed by southern, northern 
and eastern European states (Table 3, Figure 2B).
Inventory of needs and suggestions
Suggestions were received from 60 of 266 respond-
ents, of whom 42 (70%) emphasised the need for 
education, information and harmonised guidelines for 
infection control, diagnostic procedures and clinical 
management. Most remaining suggestions pertained 
to the need for support and clinical research in affected 
West African countries.
Discussion
Our exploratory survey was initiated less than three 
weeks after WHO’s Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC) declaration on 8 August 
2014 [4], to provide initial insights into the state of 
EVD preparedness in European hospitals at that time. 
It should be emphasised that this survey explored the 
Table 2
Laboratory infrastructure and diagnostics for patients with suspected Ebola virus disease in European hospitals, results 
from survey of representatives from 236 hospitals in 38 European and western Asian hospitals, August–September 2014
Total 
(n=236)
(%)
Would admit patient 
with suspected EVD 
(n=111) 
(%)
Would not admit 
patient with suspected 
EVD (n = 99)  
(%)
Do not know 
(n = 26) 
(%)
Microbiology laboratory present 231 (97.9) 109 (98.2) 97 (98.0) 25 (96.2)
BSL2
Yes 132 (57.1) 76 (69.7) 49 (50.5) 7 (28.0)
No 26 (11.3) 9 (8.3) 16 (16.5) 1 (4.0)
Do not know 73 (31.6) 24 (22.0) 32 (33.0) 17 (68.0)
BSL3
Yes 56 (24.2) 39 (35.8) 14 (14.4) 3 (12.0)
No 93 (40.3) 43 (39.4) 46 (47.4) 4 (16.0)
Do not know 82 (35.5) 27 (24.8) 37 (38.1) 18 (72.0)
Ebola virus diagnostics
On site 17 (7.2) 14 (12.6) 1 (1.0) 2 (7.7)
National reference laboratory 140 (59.3) 64 (57.7) 65 (65.7) 11 (42.3)
International reference laboratory 30 (12.7) 22 (19.8) 8 (8.1) 0 (0)
Not performed 4 (1.7) 3 (2.7) 1 (1.0) 0 (0)
Do not know 45 (19.1) 8 (7.2) 24 (24.2) 13 (50.0)
EVD: Ebola virus disease; BSL: biosafety level.
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preparedness to admit patients with suspected EVD at 
the level of hospitals and no inferences can be made 
from the results of this survey with regards to prepar-
edness at national levels.
At the time of the survey (August–September 2014), the 
vast majority of admitting hospitals were engaged in 
various preparedness activities such as revision of pro-
tocols, training of HCWs and implementation of a local 
OMT. Recent healthcare-associated cases in the US and 
Spain have demonstrated the importance of training of 
HCWs in personal protective equipment regimens [7,8], 
and the finding that 27% of hospitals indicated they 
had not performed or planned training of HCWs shows 
room for improvement. At the time of the survey, 46% 
of admitting hospitals had planned or carried out exer-
cises to test protocols. Given the complexity of issues 
surrounding admission of patients with suspected 
EVD, such exercises are essential. Preparedness activi-
ties were significantly less frequent in hospitals that 
would not admit patients or were not sure whether they 
would. Although unlikely, suspected EVD patients may 
present at any healthcare setting, and so awareness of 
initial management of suspected cases is important for 
all settings, including non-admitting centres. Almost 
all respondents indicated the availability of initial tri-
age protocols, suggesting that undetected hospitali-
sations are unlikely. However, some training of HCWs 
for this scenario also in non-admitting hospitals seems 
prudent.
Technical characteristics of admission rooms varied 
across admitting hospitals, with differences observed 
between European regions. Admission rooms in a sub-
stantial proportion of hospitals lacked one or more 
characteristics considered to be important for control 
of highly infectious pathogens and 5% of hospitals 
appeared to have none of these characteristics. The 
required conditions for treatment of EVD patients is 
an issue of some debate: EBOV is not considered to 
be transmitted by aerosol, which is the underlying 
assumption in the design of high-containment patient 
rooms, but the intensive-care setting may include 
exceptional circumstances where infectious droplets or 
aerosols may be generated, e.g. during intubation and 
ventilation [10,11]. Therefore, while standard contact 
precautions would generally suffice for management 
of EVD patients, this may differ for such high-care set-
tings. Our analysis did not provide this level of detail. 
Of note, the proportions of hospital admission rooms 
with characteristics such as the presence of an ante-
room and availability of negative pressure were higher 
than observed in a previous survey of emergency 
departments in 14 European countries (87% and 69% 
vs 46% and 42%, respectively) but, not unexpectedly, 
lower than those observed in a survey of 48 isolation 
facilities for highly infectious diseases in 16 European 
countries (100% and 90% respectively) [12,13].
With regards to laboratory infrastructure, our survey 
data lacked the resolution to assess in detail whether 
and to what extent laboratories are compliant with rec-
ommendations from WHO, ECDC and/or CDC. However, 
it should be noted that 8% of admitting hospitals did 
not appear to have the absolute minimal level labora-
tory containment (BSL2) needed for handling speci-
mens from EVD patients, which indicates less than 
optimal capacity for biocontainment during processing 
blood specimens for EBOV diagnostics and/or routine 
supportive diagnostics. During the course of illness, 
clinical specimens can contain very high viral loads for 
extended periods of time [14,15], and a careful assess-
ment of the risks for processing such specimens in 
the local laboratories is crucial. Laboratories without 
BSL2 containment should therefore be encouraged 
to upgrade their facilities and refer samples to labo-
ratories with BSL2 or preferably BSL3 facilities in the 
meantime.
Availability of national and local hospital guidelines 
for management of patients with (suspected) haemor-
rhagic fever was indicated by a majority of respond-
ents with highest availabilities observed in admitting 
hospitals and in western European countries. Of note, 
discordant responses from the same country in relation 
to availability of national guidelines were observed on 
several occasions (data not shown), indicating that 
differences in awareness of guidelines exist within 
countries. This might illustrate the importance and 
Figure 3
Preparedness activities for patients with suspected Ebola 
virus disease in European hospitals, results from survey 
of representatives from 236 hospitals in 38 European and 
western Asian countries, August–September 2014
HCW: healthcare workers; OMT: outbreak management team.
Percentages are shown separately for admitting and non-admitting 
hospitals and for those not aware whether  
Ebola virus disease-suspected patients would be admitted.
0
20
40
60
80
100
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Admission (n=111)
Non-admission (n=99)
Admission unknown (n=26)
Ac
tu
al
is
at
io
n 
gu
id
el
in
es
Lo
ca
l O
M
T
Ex
er
ci
se
s
Re
gi
on
al
/n
at
io
na
l O
M
T
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 H
CW
O
th
er
7www.eurosurveillance.org
Table 3
Geographical comparisons of hospitals and willingness and capacity to admit patients with suspected Ebola virus disease, 
results from survey of representatives from 236 hospitals in 38 European and western Asian countries, August–September 
2014
Geographical regiona
Northern Europe Southern Europe Eastern Europe Western Europe Western Asia
Number of hospitals (%)
Received questionnaire 138 257 106 219 16
Responded 44 (31.8 93 (36.2) 26 (24.5) 66 (30.1) 7 (43.8)
Would admit suspected EVD patient 25 (56.8) 40 (43.0) 3 (11.5) 37 (56.1) 6 (85.7)
Would not admit suspected EVD patient 14 (31.8) 41 (44.1) 18 (69.2) 25 (37.9) 1 (14.30
Do not know 5 (11.4) 12 (12.9) 5 (19.2) 4 (6.1) 0 (0)
National guidelines
Yes 34 (77.3) 71 (76.3) 12 (46.2) 57 (86.4) 7 (100)
No 3 (6.8) 15 (16.1) 6 (23.1) 6 (9.1) 0 (0)
Do not know 7 (15.9) 7 (7.5) 8 (30.8) 3 (4.5) 0 (0)
Hospital guidelines
Yes 26 (59.1) 57 (61.3) 12 (46.2) 53 (80.3) 5 (71.4)
No 11 (25.0) 28 (30.1) 10 (38.5) 10 (15.2) 1 (14.3)
Do not know 7 (15.9) 8 (8.6) 4 (15.4) 3 (4.5) 1 (14.3)
Preparedness efforts
Revision of protocols 26 (59.1) 65 (69.9) 14 (53.8) 56 (84.8) 6 (85.7)
Training HCWs 17 (38.6) 50 (53.8) 15 (57.7) 44 (66.7) 5 (71.4)
Hospital OMT 18 (40.1) 46 (49.5) 9 (34.6) 43 (65.2) 5 (71.4)
National OMT 10 (22.7) 33 (35.5) 6 (23.1) 37 (56.1) 3 (42.9)
Exercise 8 (18.2) 24 (25.8) 3 (11.5) 31 (47.0) 1 (14.3)
Admission rooms
Anteroom 22 (88.0) 32 (80.0) 2 (66.7) 34 (91.9) 6 (100)
Negative pressure 22 (88.0) 23 (57.5) 1 (33.3) 27 (73.0) 4 (66.7)
Dedicated ventilation 18 (72.0) 18 (45.0) 1 (33.3) 24 (64.9) 4 (66.7)
HEPA filtration 12 (48.0) 14 (35.0) 2 (66.7) 17 (45.9) 2 (33.3)
None 0 (0) 2 (5.0) 0 (0) 1 (2.7) 0 (0.0)
Unknown 1 (4.0) 2 (5.0) 0 (0) 2 (5.4) 0 (0.0)
Laboratories
Microbiology laboratory 44 (100) 92 (98.9) 24 (92.3) 65 (98.5) 7 (100)
BSL2
Yes 18 (40.9) 51 (55.4) 11 (45.8) 46 (70.8) 6 (85.7)
No 4 (9.1) 16 (17.4) 2 (8.3) 3 (4.6) 1 (14.3)
Unknown 22 (50.0) 25 (27.2) 11 (45.8) 16 (24.6) 0 (0)
BSL3
Yes 10 (22.7) 19 (20.7) 2 (8.3) 24 (36.9) 1 (14.3)
No 11 (25.0) 44 (47.8) 11 (45.8) 21 (32.3) 6 (85.7)
Unknown 23 (52.3) 29 (31.5) 11 (45.8) 20 (30.8) 0 (0)
BSL: biosafety level; EVD: Ebola virus disease; HCW: healthcare worker; HEPA: high-efficiency particulate air; OMT: outbreak management 
team.
a  European regions according to United Nations Geoscheme (United Nations Statistics Division, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/
m49regin.htm) [7]. Included Asian countries are Israel and Turkey.
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challenges of dissemination of guidelines, also at 
national levels. At the same time, the need and desire 
for guidance was illustrated by responses to our open 
request for suggestions, the vast majority of which 
emphasised a need for education, information and har-
monised guidelines, especially for diagnostic issues 
and clinical management of patients.
Our survey has several limitations. First of all, although 
the geographical distribution of participating hospitals 
across Europe was excellent, the survey results may 
not be fully representative of European medical profes-
sionals and hospitals for several reasons. The survey 
was circulated only to hospitals actively participating in 
established clinical networks and these may not be rep-
resentative of European hospitals overall. Furthermore, 
the response rate was fairly low: responses were 
received from 27% of colleagues representing 32% of 
hospitals, which means that the survey results may 
also not be fully representative of hospitals to which 
the survey was circulated. The majority of responses 
(78%) were from tertiary care hospitals, which might 
suggest overrepresentation of tertiary care settings. 
However, the extent of this possible overrepresenta-
tion could not be determined since no information was 
available about the settings (i.e. primary, secondary or 
tertiary care) of hospitals that did not participate in the 
survey. Nevertheless, as tertiary care centres generally 
have a central and leading role in preparedness efforts 
for emerging health crises, our survey results do serve 
as important indicators of the state of preparedness 
in Europe. Secondly, several of the questions in our 
survey remained unanswered (‘do not know’) a sub-
stantial proportion of respondents, likely due in large 
part to differences in medical background of respond-
ents (ranging from intensive care specialists to clinical 
microbiologists) and the variety of topics addressed. 
However, close collaboration between these special-
ists is clearly needed to provide optimal and safe care 
for EVD patients. Thirdly, as the number of participat-
ing hospitals differed substantially between regions, 
with relatively low numbers from eastern Europe and 
western Asia, geographical differences in the results of 
this survey should be interpreted with caution. Finally, 
this survey represents a snapshot of the state of affairs 
six months after the EVD outbreak in West Africa 
became apparent to the world and three weeks after it 
had been declared a PHEIC. Since then, preparedness 
activities of hospitals, including training and exer-
cises, will undoubtedly have intensified globally given 
the continuing and expanding crisis in West Africa and 
emergence of travel-associated cases elsewhere. It 
will be interesting to assess whether this is indeed the 
case in a future follow-up survey.
In summary, this survey has provided important initial 
insights into the preparedness and capacity to admit 
patients suspected for EVD in European hospitals. 
These results, including identified gaps or concerns, 
help to provide direction towards further preparedness 
activities and prioritisation thereof. 
Platform for European Preparedness against (re-) emerging 
epidemics (PREPARE), and affiliated clinical networks
Community-Acquired Competence Network (CAPNETZ www.
capnetz.de), European Society of Intensive Care Medicine 
(ESICM www.esicm.org), COMbatting BACTerial resistance 
in Europe (COMBACTE www.combacte.com) and Pediatric 
European Network for the Treatment of AIDS (PENTA http://
www.penta-id.org). 
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